Non-Popperian Epistemology

Any epistemological framework that rejects or radically modifies Karl Popper’s key tenets: falsification as the demarcation criterion (a theory is scientific only if it is falsifiable), the asymmetry between verification and falsification, and the rejection of inductive reasoning. Non‑Popperian epistemologies include Bayesian epistemology (beliefs updated by probabilities, which uses induction), Kuhnian paradigm theory (science progresses through revolutions, not falsification), and various forms of coherentism or reliabilism. They argue that Popper’s norms describe only a small part of actual scientific practice (e.g., falsification works poorly for historical sciences like cosmology). Non‑Popperian approaches often accept that evidence can confirm theories, not just falsify them, and that scientific knowledge is socially and historically situated.

Non-Popperian Epistemology Example: “Non‑Popperian epistemology points out that geologists accept plate tectonics not because it has survived falsification attempts, but because it unifies diverse observations in a coherent framework—confirmation, not falsification, drove acceptance.”

Non-Popperian Epistemology by Abzugal June 2, 2026