Metaskepticism

A second-order form of skepticism that questions the tools, methods, and frameworks of skepticism itself. Where traditional skepticism doubts knowledge claims, metaskepticism doubts the skeptic’s own criteria—asking whether the standards used to doubt are themselves justified, whether skepticism can be applied to itself without incoherence, and whether skeptical arguments often smuggle in their own unexamined assumptions. Metaskepticism forces the skeptic to become self‑reflective, examining the philosophical, social, and cognitive conditions that make skeptical practice possible. It’s the move from “what do we know?” to “how do we know what counts as knowing, and what are the limits of that knowing?”

Example: “He prided himself on being a hard‑nosed skeptic, but her metaskepticism turned the tables: ‘How do you know your demand for ‘extraordinary evidence’ isn’t just a rhetorical shield that protects your own beliefs?’”

Metaskepticism by Abzugal Nammugal Enkigal March 24, 2026