8 definitions by Blah #5
1. The study of economics based upon the priniciple of incentives. Occasionally suggests theories that reactionaries find offensive, such as the notion that legalized abortion reduces crime rates.
2. A book defining the above, co-authored by Levitt and Dubner
2. A book defining the above, co-authored by Levitt and Dubner
Wow, I never thought of that before
by Blah #5 June 5, 2005
"2 car garage that was turned into the ultimate fucken rootin facility and at the grand openin there was a massive fucken orgy n it was filmed. all the floors al walls r like cushions n shit so fucken anywhere ur bangin u will be comfortable. n fucken onli sik cunts and hot bitches r allowed in n shit n if u try get in without jabbas conscent hes a big blak fucken cunt so look out he may get a kunt to root u in the asshole and or penetrate you in other holes. all in all jabbas fucken pad is soo good u can fuken hav the best root n shit n even if ur tryin to root a chik thats fucken frigate n shit if u take her 2 the pad u will hav a fucken instant easy root."
by Blah #5 June 5, 2005
A century-long attempt by the American government to suppress the recreational use of narcotics, based for the bulk of its history upon racial prejudice. The first major piece of federal legislation (the Harrison Act) was passed in 1914, chiefly justified by a fear of east-asian opium. In the subsequent years, marijuana became the primary focus of drug warriors as its use was increasingly associated with Mexican immigrants and the (black-dominated) jazz scene. Correlating drug use with inner-city crime, Richard Nixon (and later Ronald Reagan) explicitly declared war on drug use in the US, and allocated massive spending increases to the associated federal bureaus. While the rhetoric used by George Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush was less harsh, no effort has been made in the past twenty years to rein in federal spending on the drug war; over that span the media spotlight was shifted from inner-city crack abuse to inner-city heroin abuse to youth ecstasy use to rural methamphetamine use in the hopes of maintaining hysteria.
The war on drugs has focused primarily upon two weakly-related goals: the reduction of domestic demand for drugs based upon punitive measures (that is, jail time) and the reduction of foreign supply through crop eradication and the interception of drug shipments (the end goal being to raise US prices by lowering supply). As is borne out by the US government's own data, both strategies are crippled by deep logical flaws.
The first flaw concerns the economics of black markets: rendering a product illegal does little to raise the cost of its production, but does much to raise its price. Profits soar, creating a massive incentive for new players to enter the business at all levels. Because drugs are cheap and easy to produce, farmers in poor areas can make better money and grow larger crops than they can with fruits and vegetables. Because drugs are cheap and easy to sell, dealers in poor areas can make more than they can working a minimum wage job. The profitability of the drug trade poses another problem as well: any time a major figure is arrested or killed, another person, or worse, several persons, are available to replace them, doing nothing to stem the trade but increasing its violence.
The second flaw is inherent to the logic of the drug warriors' attempts to restrict supply: In an ordinary market, prices vary consistently with supply, but the illegality of drugs creates a price floor: At high levels of supply prices are artificially held high by the mere fact that drugs are illegal. Until a certain threshold of drug interception is reached (roughly 70-80% of incoming shipments) prices will be more or less constant. The US currently estimates it finds 10% of the drugs entering the country.
The drug war does nothing to prevent addiction or lower prices: the National Survey on Drug Use and Health has shown an increase in addiction rates over the past thirty years, and a sharp drop in prices. The only success, such as it is, has been a drop in the casual (infrequent and non-dangerous) use of marijuana.
There are of course many disastrous social consequences to the War on Drugs, but they are too many and too depressing to discuss here.
The war on drugs has focused primarily upon two weakly-related goals: the reduction of domestic demand for drugs based upon punitive measures (that is, jail time) and the reduction of foreign supply through crop eradication and the interception of drug shipments (the end goal being to raise US prices by lowering supply). As is borne out by the US government's own data, both strategies are crippled by deep logical flaws.
The first flaw concerns the economics of black markets: rendering a product illegal does little to raise the cost of its production, but does much to raise its price. Profits soar, creating a massive incentive for new players to enter the business at all levels. Because drugs are cheap and easy to produce, farmers in poor areas can make better money and grow larger crops than they can with fruits and vegetables. Because drugs are cheap and easy to sell, dealers in poor areas can make more than they can working a minimum wage job. The profitability of the drug trade poses another problem as well: any time a major figure is arrested or killed, another person, or worse, several persons, are available to replace them, doing nothing to stem the trade but increasing its violence.
The second flaw is inherent to the logic of the drug warriors' attempts to restrict supply: In an ordinary market, prices vary consistently with supply, but the illegality of drugs creates a price floor: At high levels of supply prices are artificially held high by the mere fact that drugs are illegal. Until a certain threshold of drug interception is reached (roughly 70-80% of incoming shipments) prices will be more or less constant. The US currently estimates it finds 10% of the drugs entering the country.
The drug war does nothing to prevent addiction or lower prices: the National Survey on Drug Use and Health has shown an increase in addiction rates over the past thirty years, and a sharp drop in prices. The only success, such as it is, has been a drop in the casual (infrequent and non-dangerous) use of marijuana.
There are of course many disastrous social consequences to the War on Drugs, but they are too many and too depressing to discuss here.
"We do know this, that more people die every year as a result of the war against drugs than die from what we call, generically, overdosing."
- William F. Buckley, Jr.
- William F. Buckley, Jr.
by Blah #5 June 12, 2005
A century-long attempt by the American government to suppress the recreational use of narcotics, based for the bulk of its history upon racial prejudice. The first major piece of federal legislation (the Harrison Act) was passed in 1914, chiefly justified by a fear of east-asian opium. In the subsequent years, marijuana became the primary focus of drug warriors as its use was increasingly associated with Mexican immigrants and the (black-dominated) jazz scene. Correlating drug use with inner-city crime, Richard Nixon (and later Ronald Reagan) explicitly declared war on drug use in the US, and allocated massive spending increases to the associated federal bureaus. While the rhetoric used by George Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush was less harsh, no effort has been made in the past twenty years to rein in federal spending on the drug war; over that span the media spotlight was shifted from inner-city crack abuse to inner-city heroin abuse to youth ecstasy use to rural methamphetamine use in the hopes of maintaining hysteria.
The war on drugs has focused primarily upon two weakly-related goals: the reduction of domestic demand for drugs based upon punitive measures (that is, jail time) and the reduction of foreign supply through crop eradication and the interception of drug shipments (the end goal being to raise US prices by lowering supply). As is borne out by the US government's own data, both strategies are crippled by deep logical flaws.
The first flaw concerns the economics of black markets: rendering a product illegal does little to raise the cost of its production, but does much to raise its price. Profits soar, creating a massive incentive for new players to enter the business at all levels. Because drugs are cheap and easy to produce, farmers in poor areas can make better money and grow larger crops than they can with fruits and vegetables. Because drugs are cheap and easy to sell, dealers in poor areas can make more than they can working a minimum wage job. The profitability of the drug trade poses another problem as well: any time a major figure is arrested or killed, another person, or worse, several persons, are available to replace them, doing nothing to stem the trade but increasing its violence.
The second flaw is inherent to the logic of the drug warriors' attempts to restrict supply: In an ordinary market, prices vary consistently with supply, but the illegality of drugs creates a price floor: At high levels of supply prices are artificially held high by the mere fact that drugs are illegal. Until a certain threshold of drug interception is reached (roughly 70-80% of incoming shipments) prices will be more or less constant. The US currently estimates it finds 10% of the drugs entering the country.
The drug war does nothing to prevent addiction or lower prices: the National Survey on Drug Use and Health has shown an increase in addiction rates over the past thirty years, and a sharp drop in prices. The only success, such as it is, has been a drop in the casual (infrequent and non-dangerous) use of marijuana.
There are of course many disastrous social consequences to the War on Drugs, but they are too many and too depressing to discuss here.
The war on drugs has focused primarily upon two weakly-related goals: the reduction of domestic demand for drugs based upon punitive measures (that is, jail time) and the reduction of foreign supply through crop eradication and the interception of drug shipments (the end goal being to raise US prices by lowering supply). As is borne out by the US government's own data, both strategies are crippled by deep logical flaws.
The first flaw concerns the economics of black markets: rendering a product illegal does little to raise the cost of its production, but does much to raise its price. Profits soar, creating a massive incentive for new players to enter the business at all levels. Because drugs are cheap and easy to produce, farmers in poor areas can make better money and grow larger crops than they can with fruits and vegetables. Because drugs are cheap and easy to sell, dealers in poor areas can make more than they can working a minimum wage job. The profitability of the drug trade poses another problem as well: any time a major figure is arrested or killed, another person, or worse, several persons, are available to replace them, doing nothing to stem the trade but increasing its violence.
The second flaw is inherent to the logic of the drug warriors' attempts to restrict supply: In an ordinary market, prices vary consistently with supply, but the illegality of drugs creates a price floor: At high levels of supply prices are artificially held high by the mere fact that drugs are illegal. Until a certain threshold of drug interception is reached (roughly 70-80% of incoming shipments) prices will be more or less constant. The US currently estimates it finds 10% of the drugs entering the country.
The drug war does nothing to prevent addiction or lower prices: the National Survey on Drug Use and Health has shown an increase in addiction rates over the past thirty years, and a sharp drop in prices. The only success, such as it is, has been a drop in the casual (infrequent and non-dangerous) use of marijuana.
There are of course many disastrous social consequences to the War on Drugs, but they are too many and too depressing to discuss here.
"We do know this, that more people die every year as a result of the war against drugs than die from what we call, generically, overdosing."
- William F. Buckley, Jr.
- William F. Buckley, Jr.
by Blah #5 June 8, 2005
Minneapolis is the cultural capital of Minnesota, if Minnesota can be considered to have culture; it is also the only bastion of civilization between Chicago and Seattle. Situated on the Mississippi, its downtown is roughly ten miles west of its smaller counterpart, St. Paul. Total population within the city limits is just under 400,000; there are some 3 million residents living in the greater Twin Cities region. Officially known as the "City of Lakes" (there are 22 within the borders of the city) it is also called the "Mini-Apple" by some residents to indicate a similarity (mostly imagined) to New York City. Still, Minneapolis is consistently ranked as the most literate city in the US, with a good school system (by big-city standards) and abounding cultural opportunities. Minneapolis also enjoys an impressive skyline for its size, though there is little coherence in terms of architectural style. Views of downtown are dominated by the IDS Center, Norwest Tower, and 225 South Sixth. The only other landmark of note is the Metrodome, home of the Twins and Vikings, known not only as a horrible eyesore but also as an awful venue; work is underway to build a new ballpark to be completed in 2009. Being as it is in Minnesota, Minneapolis is both very green (lots of vegetation) and very white (lots of caucasians), and it experiences weather at its most extreme. Winter lows can reach -40 and summer highs can peak above 100, with blizzards, thunderstorms, and tornadoes scattered throughout the year. Most residents are fiercely loyal to the city, but in general the city is also very welcoming of outsiders, perhaps due to the large population of transplants. Minneapolis' music scene is underrepresented nationally; due to the dominance of New York and LA in the business most of the best artists leave (e.g. Oddjobs). Overall, Minneapolis is much like any other large city: good people, good food, good and bad neighborhoods, crime, business, sports, and skyscrapers.
by Blah #5 June 5, 2005
An option available at seedy hotels allowing customers just long enough to smoke some crack and get their cock sucked.
by Blah #5 May 31, 2005
An option at some motels giving the customer just long enough to smoke some crack and get their cock sucked.
by Blah #5 June 5, 2005