I'
m glad that you brought that up because it takes me to my second problem with determinism. Let's try and visualize your argument.
D
>ID - ID
R > R
ED
So, and action is either
Random (R) or Determined. If it's Determined it's either Internally (ID) or Externally (ED) Determined. If it's Externally Determined, then you have no control. If it's Internally Determined, then the internal determination is either Determined or
Random. And I'
m guessing that by "Determined" you mean "The necessary byproduct of an antecedent chain in which the actor or mechanism could not have done otherwise," Correct? Is that close? Does that make sense? I feel like there are a lot of presuppositions that need to be unpacked.
Hym "So, how is asking whether or not something is determined or
random any different than asking whether or not my bedroom is hot or
cold? It's both. And neither. It's, like, luke warm. So, you presuppose the absence of a grey area between determined and
random. That
random and determine don't exist on a spectrum in the same way hot and cold exist on a spectrum. As though thinks can't be more or less determined or more or less
random. Is the outcome of a coin to more or less
random than the outcome of rolling a 20 sided dice? You could say that the outcome is determined I guess. By the exact about of force used to roll the dice or flip the coin.
The
relationship between the material of the dice and the material of the surface of the table or the conditions of the air in the room you'
re flipping the coin. Also, if we accept 'determined' as 'the necessary byproduct of an antecedent chain in which the actor or mechanism could not have done otherwise' you presuppose that what happens in response to a given antecedent chain is what OUGHT to happen in response to said chain. So, Antecedent Chain A -> either Outcome A or Outcome B. If ACA -> OA then you have to presuppose that what ought to happen in response to ACA is OA. If ACA -> OB then, again, you're forced to presuppose that what ought a happen in response to ACA is OB. But if the likelihood of ACA leading to OB is 1% and it HAPPENS ANYWAY... What you have is NOT an outcome that 'couldn't have been otherwise' but, rather, SHOULD have been otherwise and wasn't. Ya feel me? So, I know this doesn't demonstrate free
will but I
don't think you have been able to successfully demonstrate that there isn't a point at which 'the self' is not the fundamental locus of control in any given choice. It's a
good argument though. It's tricky. But it's like a
weird semantic blackhole. It's like saying 'Well, if you
don't actively control the firing of your neurons, you
don't actually control yourself.' Just
weird. Determined or
random."