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Definitions by Abzugal Nammugal Enkigal

Ethnography of the Scientific Community

A qualitative research method and subfield that immerses the researcher in a scientific community to observe its daily practices, rituals, hierarchies, and informal norms. Ethnographers of science do fieldwork: they attend lab meetings, observe bench work, interview scientists, and analyze how knowledge is actually made—not how textbooks say it should be made. Influenced by Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life, it reveals that science is not a logical algorithm but a social craft, with tacit knowledge, emotional labor, status games, and equipment breakdowns. It also studies how scientists negotiate what counts as a “fact” through inscription devices, persuasion, and network building.
Ethnography of the Scientific Community Example: “The ethnography of a molecular biology lab showed that ‘significant’ results were often those that confirmed the PI’s pet theory—not because of fraud, but because of subtle pressure in data interpretation. The community’s social dynamics shaped what became publishable.”

Ethnography of Scientific Consensus

An ethnographic approach that studies how scientific consensus is achieved through face-to-face meetings, conferences, workshops, and informal conversations. It examines the social micro-dynamics of consensus-building: who speaks, who is silenced, how disagreements are resolved, how consensus statements are worded, and what gets left out. It reveals that consensus is not a mechanical aggregation of votes but a negotiated performance—including compromises, strategic omissions, and power plays. It is often used to study IPCC reports, clinical guideline committees, and controversial research areas.
Ethnography of Scientific Consensus Example: “The ethnography of the IPCC consensus process revealed that the final ‘95% certainty’ wording was a compromise between scientists wanting 99% and negotiators fearing policy paralysis—consensus as social artifact, not pure evidence.”

Philosophy of Science Communication

A philosophical inquiry into the ethics, epistemology, and pragmatics of communicating science to non-scientists. It asks: what is the goal of science communication—informing, persuading, democratizing, or building trust? Should science communicators be neutral or advocate? How much uncertainty should be disclosed? It also examines the “deficit model” (assuming the public lacks facts) versus participatory models. It critiques the assumption that “more facts produce better decisions,” noting that values, risk perception, and worldviews also matter. It draws on ethics (e.g., the duty to inform without causing panic), epistemology (what counts as accessible knowledge), and rhetoric.
Example: “The philosophy of science communication challenges the idea that a graph is neutral: choosing a y-axis scale, a color scheme, and a headline are rhetorical acts that shape interpretation. Communication is never pure information transfer.”

Philosophy of Scientific Consensus

A subfield that investigates the epistemic significance of scientific consensus. Is agreement among experts a reliable guide to truth? Under what conditions? It distinguishes between consensus that emerges from genuine convergence of evidence and consensus that results from groupthink, funding bias, or social pressure. It also explores the normative question: should public policy defer to consensus, and if so, when? Philosophers debate the “consensus heuristic” (treating agreement as evidence) against the risk of argument from authority. This field became prominent during the climate change and COVID-19 debates, where dissenters accused consensus of being manufactured and defenders called denialism irrational.
Example: “The philosophy of scientific consensus notes that the consensus on smoking causing lung cancer was correct, but the consensus on lobotomies was wrong. So consensus is neither infallible nor useless—its epistemic weight depends on the health of the community.”

Philosophy of the Scientific Community

A branch of philosophy of science that examines the nature, norms, and epistemic status of scientific communities as collective knowers. It asks: can a community be rational even if its members are not? How do distributed cognition and peer agreement justify belief? What are the epistemic norms (e.g., transparency, responsiveness to criticism) that communities should follow? It bridges epistemology (what is knowledge?) and social philosophy (how do groups know?). It also debates whether consensus is evidence for truth or merely a social fact. Influenced by Kuhn, Longino, and feminist epistemology, it argues that science is fundamentally social, and therefore the community—not the individual—is the proper unit of epistemic appraisal.
Example: “The philosophy of the scientific community asks: if 99% of climate scientists agree, does that mean the 1% is irrational? Not necessarily—but the community’s norms (open debate, evidence sharing) may justify weighting consensus as evidence.”

Sociology of Science Communication

A critical field that studies the social dimensions of how science is communicated to publics—including media coverage, outreach events, social media science influencers, and public health messaging. It examines not just what is communicated, but by whom, through which channels, with what framing, and for whose benefit. It analyzes power dynamics: who gets to speak as a “scientist,” who is trusted, whose evidence is dismissed. It also studies the effects of science communication on trust, polarization, and public understanding. Unlike normative science communication (which assumes “more facts = better outcomes”), the sociology of science communication interrogates the social contexts that make communication succeed or fail, including institutional trust, cultural values, and historical legacies.
Example: “The sociology of science communication explained why vaccine hesitancy persisted despite endless fact-checking: it wasn’t lack of information, but distrust of institutions rooted in historical medical abuse—a social factor, not an information deficit.”

Sociology of the Scientific Community

A subfield of sociology that studies scientists as a social group—their norms, hierarchies, rituals, career paths, and informal networks. It examines how scientific communities are organized (e.g., the invisible college of elite researchers), how prestige is distributed (Matthew effect), how conflicts are managed, and how outsiders are excluded. Unlike philosophy of science (which studies logic and evidence), the sociology of the scientific community asks: who gets funding, who gets published, who gets tenure, and how does social structure shape what counts as knowledge? Classic studies include Merton’s norms (universalism, communism, disinterestedness, organized skepticism) and their violations in real labs. It also explores how mentorship, collaboration, and rivalry influence scientific discovery. This field demystifies the lone genius myth and reveals science as a team sport with politics.
Example: “The sociology of the scientific community showed that the ‘replication crisis’ wasn’t just about bad statistics—it was about career incentives, publication pressure, and a community that rewarded novelty over rigor.”

Sociology of Scientific Consensus

A branch of the sociology of science that studies how agreement emerges, solidifies, and is maintained within scientific communities—or how it breaks down. It examines the social processes behind consensus: conferences, citation networks, editorial boards, funding panels, and the role of key opinion leaders. It also investigates manufactured controversy (e.g., tobacco industry sowing doubt about smoking) and genuine dissent. Unlike epistemology (which asks whether consensus tracks truth), sociology of scientific consensus asks: how is consensus achieved, who benefits, and how is dissent marginalized? It explains why some scientific claims become “settled” quickly while others remain contested for decades, often due to social rather than purely evidentiary reasons.

Example: “The sociology of scientific consensus revealed that the consensus on plate tectonics didn’t emerge from a single ‘smoking gun’ study but from a gradual shift in funding, hiring, and conference invitations that marginalized fixists and amplified mobilists.”