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Definitions by Dumu The Void

Laziness Bias

The general form of Epistemological Laziness Bias—a cognitive bias where one avoids the effort of genuine inquiry, research, or reasoning, while maintaining the appearance of intellectual rigor through performative skepticism or demands on others. Laziness Bias operates across domains: in debates, it manifests as demanding sources without searching; in learning, as expecting others to summarize complex topics; in reasoning, as accepting the first plausible explanation rather than investigating further; in judgment, as relying on stereotypes rather than individual assessment. The bias lies in outsourcing cognitive labor while claiming the high ground—wanting the rewards of knowledge without the work of knowing, the status of rationality without the effort of reasoning. It's particularly prevalent online, where information is abundant but attention is scarce, and where performing skepticism is easier than actually being informed.
Example: "He'd never read the book, never even googled the topic, but he confidently declared the summary wrong and demanded she prove it. Laziness Bias: confident ignorance demanding that others do the work."
Laziness Bias by Dumu The Void March 19, 2026

Epistemological Laziness Bias

A pervasive cognitive and metacognitive bias on the internet and social media, characterized by the lazy demand for proof, evidence, or sources from others while making no effort to conduct even a simple internet search oneself. The epistemologically lazy person expects others to do their research for them, treating every claim as suspect until someone else provides documentation—yet never applying the same standard to their own beliefs. This bias complements Objectivity Bias perfectly: the lazy debater believes their own worldview is simply "objective reality" while demanding endless evidence for any view that differs. On YouTube comments, Discord servers, Reddit threads, and X/Twitter, they appear constantly: "Source?" "Proof?" "Cite?"—asked not in good faith but as a conversation-stopping weapon, a way of shifting labor onto others while performing skepticism. The irony is that they could answer their own question with thirty seconds of searching, but that would require effort, and effort is exactly what epistemological laziness avoids. It's a form of Butler Bias (demanding others do your work) specialized for online debate—a way of feeling rational while being merely lazy.
Example: "He demanded peer-reviewed sources for her claim about a basic historical fact—something he could have verified in seconds. Epistemological Laziness Bias: using the language of evidence to avoid the work of actually finding it."

Hypothesis of Extended Sciences

A broader, plural version of the Extended Causality Hypothesis, proposing that the sciences we know (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology) are not the complete set but rather the sciences that have emerged within our observational domain—while an extended set of sciences awaits discovery for domains beyond our current access. This hypothesis suggests that there may be whole fields of knowledge we haven't even imagined—sciences of higher-dimensional phenomena, of non-material realities, of consciousness as fundamental, of domains where our current categories don't apply. It provides a framework for understanding why some phenomena seem to resist scientific explanation: they belong to sciences we haven't yet developed. The hypothesis also explains why different cultures have different knowledge systems: they may have accessed different extended sciences, developed different methods for different domains. Extended sciences would be to current sciences what three-dimensional geometry is to flatland—not a contradiction but an expansion.
Example: "Indigenous knowledge systems, mystical traditions, paranormal research—the Hypothesis of Extended Sciences suggests these aren't primitive versions of our sciences but different sciences entirely, developed for domains we haven't learned to access. They're not wrong; they're extended."

Hypothesis of Extended Science

A broader version of the Extended Causality Hypothesis, proposing that the science we know (empirical method, peer review, falsification, reproducibility) is not the whole of science but a subset—the science that works within our observational domain—while an extended science may be possible for domains beyond our current access. This hypothesis suggests that there may be phenomena that cannot be studied by our current methods because they operate outside our observational capabilities, but that extended methods—yet to be developed—might access them. It provides a framework for taking anomalies seriously without abandoning scientific values: anomalies become phenomena that current science can't address but extended science might. The hypothesis also suggests that our current scientific methods might be domain-specific—perfect for studying within spacetime but inadequate for studying the extended domains that contain spacetime. Extended science would require extended methods, extended instruments, extended ways of knowing.
Example: "Paranormal phenomena resist scientific study—they're unrepeatable, unmeasurable, unpredictable. The Hypothesis of Extended Science suggests this isn't because they're unreal but because our science is designed for within-spacetime phenomena. Extended phenomena require extended science."

Theory of Extended Reality

A broader version of the Extended Causality Hypothesis, proposing that the reality we experience (3D space, linear time, material objects, causal order) is not the whole of reality but a subset—a projection or interface of an extended reality that includes dimensions, domains, and phenomena we cannot directly access. This theory draws on analogies with virtual reality: what we experience as "reality" might be like the interface of a vast simulation, hiding the underlying code while presenting a usable surface. Extended reality would include the hidden dimensions, the higher-dimensional spaces, the domains beyond spacetime, the levels of organization we can't perceive. It would include phenomena we currently call paranormal, spiritual, or impossible—not because they don't exist, but because they exist in aspects of reality we haven't learned to access. The theory provides a framework for integrating scientific, spiritual, and anomalous experiences into a coherent understanding: all are real, but at different levels of extended reality.
*Example: "Near-death experiences, UFO sightings, mystical visions—the Theory of Extended Reality suggests these aren't hallucinations or lies. They're genuine experiences of aspects of reality we normally can't access, like a 2D being glimpsing the third dimension. The reality is extended; our perception is limited."*

Hypothesis of Extended Epistemology

A broader version of the Extended Causality Hypothesis, applying specifically to knowledge itself—proposing that the epistemology we know (how we know what we know, what counts as evidence, how truth is established) applies within our cognitive domain, but extended epistemological principles may operate beyond it. This hypothesis suggests that there may be ways of knowing that we cannot access from within our current epistemic framework—forms of knowledge that don't fit our standards of evidence, truths that can't be established by our methods, understandings that come through channels we don't recognize. It provides a framework for taking seriously claims of non-standard knowledge (intuition, revelation, direct perception) without abandoning epistemic standards—they might be invalid by our epistemology but valid within an extended framework we haven't yet accessed. The hypothesis also explains epistemic disagreement: different epistemic frameworks might be accessing different aspects of reality, and what seems irrational from one perspective might be rational from another.
Example: "The shaman claimed to know things he couldn't possibly know by our standards—no evidence, no method, no verification. The Hypothesis of Extended Epistemology suggests he might be operating according to epistemic principles we haven't discovered yet, accessing knowledge through channels we can't detect. Not irrational—just extended rationality."

Hypothesis of Extended Biology

A broader version of the Extended Causality Hypothesis, applying specifically to biological phenomena—proposing that the biology we know (evolution by natural selection, DNA-based inheritance, carbon-based life) applies within our observable domain, but extended biological principles may operate beyond it. This hypothesis suggests that phenomena currently considered impossible (spontaneous generation, radical longevity, non-DNA inheritance, life in impossible environments) might be lawful within an extended biological framework. It provides a framework for understanding claims of extraordinary biological phenomena without dismissing them as impossible—they might be impossible within our biology but possible within extended biology. The hypothesis also suggests that life might exist in forms we can't recognize, operating according to biological laws we haven't yet discovered, in dimensions we can't access.
Example: "The organism seemed to repair itself instantly, regenerate from nothing, live indefinitely—violating everything we know about biology. The Hypothesis of Extended Biology suggests it might be operating according to biological laws we haven't discovered yet, in domains we can't access. Not magic—just extended nature."