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Definitions by Abzugal

Psychiatrification

The practice of framing life problems, social conflicts, and political dissent as psychiatric disorders requiring diagnosis, treatment, or institutional control. It pathologizes poverty as “adjustment disorder,” protest as “oppositional defiant disorder,” and spiritual experiences as “psychosis.” Common in mental health advocacy and in countries with strong biomedical psychiatry, psychiatrification expands the domain of psychiatry into every aspect of human suffering. Critics argue it medicalizes social issues, depoliticizes dissent, and shifts focus from structural change to individual treatment. It is a form of epistemic colonization.
Psychiatrification Example: “The student activists were psychiatrified by the university administration: referrals to counseling, not dialogue. Their critique of administration policies was reframed as ‘emotional dysregulation.’”

Psychologification

The act of explaining social, economic, political, or cultural phenomena as solely or primarily psychological processes—individual cognitions, emotions, personality traits, or biases. It ignores structural factors (class, race, colonialism, capitalism) in favor of internal mental states. Common in neoliberal social science and self‑help culture, psychologification reframes poverty as “learned helplessness,” inequality as “fixed mindset,” and resistance as “anger management issues.” Critics argue it individualizes systemic problems, blaming victims and exonerating power structures. It is a form of psychological reductionism that serves the status quo.
Psychologification Example: “The consultant psychologified workplace burnout as ‘poor stress management,’ ignoring 60‑hour weeks, understaffing, and zero job security. Employees were sent to resilience training, while management changed nothing.”

Neurotransmisseromania

An extreme version of neurotransmisserification, where neurotransmitters are treated not just as causal factors but as the sole and sufficient explanation for all human phenomena. Neurotransmisseromania reduces friendship to oxytocin, ambition to dopamine, calm to GABA, and excitement to glutamate. It is common in online neuromania communities and in overly simplified “brain health” influencers. Critics argue it is a form of magical thinking dressed in lab coats: a single molecule cannot bear the weight of meaning, history, and relationship. It also ignores the role of neural circuits, brain regions, and the body.
Neurotransmisseromania Example: “The neurotransmisseromaniac told a grieving widow that her sorrow was ‘just low serotonin and norepinephrine.’ He offered pills, not comfort. He reduced a meaningful loss to a chemical deficit.”

Neurotransmisserification

The act of reducing any mental state, emotion, or behavior to the action of specific neurotransmitters (serotonin, dopamine, norepinephrine, GABA, glutamate). It treats complex psychological phenomena as mere chemical balances: depression is low serotonin, anxiety is high norepinephrine, love is oxytocin. Neurotransmisserification is common in pharmaceutical marketing and reductionist science writing. Critics note that neurotransmitters have multiple functions, their effects depend on receptor subtypes and brain region, and the same chemical can produce opposite effects in different contexts. It is a form of chemical reductionism that ignores the whole person.
Neurotransmisserification Example: “The ad for antidepressants relied on neurotransmisserification: ‘Depression is a chemical imbalance.’ The fine print admitted that this is a hypothesis, not a fact. But the damage was done.”

Dopaminomania

A variant of Neuromania where dopamine becomes the master explanatory key for all human behavior, thought, and feeling. Dopaminomania holds that political orientation, religious belief, artistic taste, and even philosophical positions can be reduced to individual differences in dopamine receptor density or tonic/phasic release. It is common in evolutionary psychology and “neuro‑libertarian” circles. Critics argue it is a secular replacement for demonology: instead of evil spirits, we have dopamine imbalances. It also ignores that dopamine's role is highly context‑dependent and that correlation does not imply causation.
Dopaminomania Example: “The dopaminomaniac claimed that ‘conservatives have more dopamine receptors,’ ignoring decades of political science research on socialization, material interests, and historical context. His molecule explained nothing.”
Dopaminomania by Abzugal June 5, 2026

Dopaminification

The reductive practice of explaining complex human experiences—love, creativity, political beliefs, spiritual ecstasy—as mere dopamine release. It reduces motivation to “reward seeking,” art to “pattern recognition pleasure,” and social bonding to “oxytocin‑dopamine loops.” Common in pop‑neuroscience and reductionist online forums, dopaminification ignores that neurotransmitters have multiple functions, interact with other chemicals, and are embedded in meaningful contexts. It is a form of neuro‑phrenology: mapping every mental state onto a single molecule. Critics argue that if everything is dopamine, then the claim “dopaminification is true” is also just a dopamine spike—self‑refuting.
Dopaminification Example: “He dopaminified her joy at seeing a sunset as ‘just a dopamine hit from unexpected reward,’ ignoring aesthetic experience, memory, and the cultural meaning of beauty.”
Dopaminification by Abzugal June 5, 2026

Non-Popperian Epistemology

Any epistemological framework that rejects or radically modifies Karl Popper’s key tenets: falsification as the demarcation criterion (a theory is scientific only if it is falsifiable), the asymmetry between verification and falsification, and the rejection of inductive reasoning. Non‑Popperian epistemologies include Bayesian epistemology (beliefs updated by probabilities, which uses induction), Kuhnian paradigm theory (science progresses through revolutions, not falsification), and various forms of coherentism or reliabilism. They argue that Popper’s norms describe only a small part of actual scientific practice (e.g., falsification works poorly for historical sciences like cosmology). Non‑Popperian approaches often accept that evidence can confirm theories, not just falsify them, and that scientific knowledge is socially and historically situated.
Non-Popperian Epistemology Example: “Non‑Popperian epistemology points out that geologists accept plate tectonics not because it has survived falsification attempts, but because it unifies diverse observations in a coherent framework—confirmation, not falsification, drove acceptance.”