a term meant to be used in a playful manner, but also has its uses in the derogatory. "like your face" means that something is similar in appearance, or feeling taken from experience to your face..
by Becca May 9, 2005
Conversational non-sequitur designed to kill an internet discussion stone dead. Always, ALWAYS, FUCKING ALWAYS DAMMIT to be spelt out as above, capitalised final word, full stop and all. Originated in Scotland.
Dave: Scotland Scotland Scotland
Splog: I don't like your FACE.
Dave: ...
Splog: I don't like your FACE.
Immanuel Kant: Nature is the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things in themselves, we could never know it either a priori or a posteriori. Not a priori, for how can we know what belongs to things in themselves, since this never can be done by the dissection of our concepts (in analytical judgments)? We do not want to know what is contained in our concept of a thing (for the concept describes what belongs to its logical being), but what is in the actuality of the thing superadded to our concept, and by what the thing itself is determined in its existence outside the concept. Our understanding, and the conditions on which alone it can connect the determinations of things in their existence, do not prescribe any rule to things themselves; these do not conform to our understanding, but it must conform itself to them; they must therefore be first given us in order to gather these determinations from them, wherefore they would not be known a priori.
Splog: I don't like your FACE.
Immanuel Kant: ...
Splog: I don't like your FACE.
Dave: ...
Splog: I don't like your FACE.
Immanuel Kant: Nature is the existence of things, so far as it is determined according to universal laws. Should nature signify the existence of things in themselves, we could never know it either a priori or a posteriori. Not a priori, for how can we know what belongs to things in themselves, since this never can be done by the dissection of our concepts (in analytical judgments)? We do not want to know what is contained in our concept of a thing (for the concept describes what belongs to its logical being), but what is in the actuality of the thing superadded to our concept, and by what the thing itself is determined in its existence outside the concept. Our understanding, and the conditions on which alone it can connect the determinations of things in their existence, do not prescribe any rule to things themselves; these do not conform to our understanding, but it must conform itself to them; they must therefore be first given us in order to gather these determinations from them, wherefore they would not be known a priori.
Splog: I don't like your FACE.
Immanuel Kant: ...
by Your FACE. December 19, 2005